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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE KENTUCKY STATUTE
REFUSING A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF THE
SMALLNESS OF DAMAGES

By W. T. DRunY*
"A new trial shall not be granted on account of the smallness of
damages in an action for injury to the person or reputation, or in
any other action in which the damages equal the actual pecuniary
injury sustained."'

While this article is prepared for the lawyers composing
the Bench and Bar of Kentucky, it will not be without interest to the lawyers of Arkansas, Indiana and Oklahoma, for this
same statute is now on the books of those states. 2
The toleration of this statute is the result of the failure of
men to think of the wrongs that can be and have been wrought
under it, and it is in the hope of inducing thought on the part
of lawyers that this article is written. A great lawyer once
said:
"Whenever it looks like some monstrous wrong is about to be
wrought by the operation of a statute it is time to look at the constitution for our constitutions contain the crystalized wisdom of the ages
while our statutes are often the experiments of the hour."

It conflicts with 14th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.
In this amendment it is provided among other things:
"Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Section 340 of Ky. Civil Code expressly gives to the trial
judge the power to set aside the verdict of the jury if in his
opinion the damages awarded are excessive, yet by Section 341
of the same code, this statute in question attempts to deny to the
trial judge the right to set aside the verdict of the jury when
he regards the damages awarded inadequate. That can not be
equal protection of the law.
* Commissioner of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Sec. 341 Ky. Code of 1876, Sec. 370 Code of 1854 and Sec. 382
Code of 1851.
3 Sec. 1312 Ark. Stats., formerly Sec. 372 Ark. Code of 1868. Sec.
611 Ind. Stats., formerly Sec. 353, Ind. Code. Sec. 399 Okla. Stats. of
1931, Sec. 573 Okla. Stats., 1921, Sec. 5034 Okla. Stats. 1910.
1

KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL

What would you think of a judge who should greet two
opposing litigants in this manner:
"Be seated gentlemen.

I shall endeavor to see that you get an

impartial jury and a fair trial, and to you Mr. Defendant, I will say
that if the jury goes wild and returns against you what I deem an
excessive verdict I will set it aside, but Mr. Plaintiff if the jury goes
wild and awards you an inadequate verdict, I will do nothing for you
no matter how inadequate I may deem it to be."

Would you want to try your case before a judge, who would
take such an attitude? Of course not. Yet that attitude is
forced on every trial judge in Kentucky, Indiana, Arkansas and
Oklahoma by the statute in question.
Courts are set up and laws are written for the establishment of justice. The moment inequality appears justice has
gone, and injustice is at hand. If a statute applies unequally
justice can not result from its operation. Can it be constitutional for the legislature to invest a trial judge with plenary
power to protect a defendant from brain-storms in the jury box
and deny to that judge all power to protect a plaintiff from a
like peril? There can be but one answer that the average reasonable man would give, and that is "No," for it does not look to
him like this law affords equal protection; neither does it look
so to the text writers and to the courts.
"A statute Is void which prescribes a rule of procedure that
operates as a discrimination between persons who are similarly situated, as, for example, an act which allows an appeal in civil cases
to one party without allowing it on equal terms to the other party."'

In 1907 the legislature of Illinois passed an act 4 regulating practice in its appellate courts, and in such act provided,
that in actions at law, appellate courts should make findings of
facts, and that if the appellate court affirmed the judgment
such finding of facts should be conclusive but if the appellate
court reversed the judgment, and the case were taken by writ
of error or appeal to the Supreme Court that it should there
stand for review both on the law and the facts. It was held
this statute conferred a special privilege upon the original
'12 C. 3., D. 1185, Sec. 948.
'Acts of Illinois 1907, p. 443.
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plaintiff in error, that it denied the equal protection of the law,
and hence was unconstitutional and void. 5
The above statement of the supposed greeting of the presiding judge to the two opposing litigants arouses a feeling of
revulsion in the breast of the average reasonable man. To him
it is absolutely unthinkable that in any civilized community
such a judge should be allowed to preside over a court and he
would never believe it possible that there could be any civilized
state where such a statute would be tolerated for a moment if
he did not see it in black and white on the printed page. A
statute is void which does not grant the same rights to all persons similarly situated. 6 This statute permits a judge to protect a defendant from a jury's passion and prejudice, and
because it attempts to deny him the right to afford similar protection to a plaintiff it is void. Due process and equal protection are denied by a statute that discriminates between the
parties litigant, 7 and a statute is void for constitutional conflict which grants to some a remedy denied to others similarly
situated or forbids tb one litigant protection afforded to
another.8
CONFILICT WITH CONSTITUTION OP KENTUCKY.

Its Denials of Justice.
In Magna Carta, it is written: "To no one will we sell, to
no one will we deny or delay, right or justice."9 Magna Carta
was not something new but was almost entirely a Latin translation of old Anglo Saxon charters and traditions.' 0 The ideas
contained in it were already old when King John was born
r Jones v. Chicago, R. I. d P. Ry. Co., 83 N. E. 215 (1907); Hecker v.
1. C. B. Co., 83 N. E. 456 (1908); Green v. Red Cross Med. Soc., 83 N. E.
1081 (1908).
812 C. J., p. 1210, Sec. 983, note 85.
112 C. J., p. 1239, Sec. 1015, note 80.
8 12 C. J., D. 1183, Sec. 942, notes 39 and 40.
AlMagna Carta, Ch. 40. "Nulli vendemus, numl negabimus, aut

differmus, rectum aut justiciam."

"8See Article by Stevenson, Eng. History, Rev. XXIII, 1-8. See
Article by Dr. Poole, Eng. History, Rev. XXVIII, 444.
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and would have come down to us if he had never lived and
sinned in England. Englishmen and all those who have derived
their systems of jurisprudence from England have cherished
this promise made in Magna Carta; they have clung to the idea,
though changes have been made in the verbiage. Thus Kentucky writes this in her constitution, and similar provisions may
be found in others.
"All courts shall be open and every person, for an injury done
him in his land, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial or delay.""

Surely these provisions are not were idle boasts. The
makers of these constitutions meant what they were so
solmenly writing there. They meant that right and justice
should be had without it being necessary to purchase it from
anyone and that nobody could deny it or delay it. That the
legislature can not delay right or justice was settled early in
the history of this nation. 12 Recently it was decided in Kentucky that the legislature could not directly deny right and
justice' 3 and we are now considering the constitutionality of a
statute that attempts to enable a jury to do so.
These constitutional provisions do not mean that every
man who fancies his neighbor has injured him can sue his neighbor and recover. The neighbor may be in the right and the
plaintiff in the wrong, but they do mean that when the neighbor
is sued and the juny finds for the plaintiff upon every issue and
only awards him a nominal recovery, that right and justice has
been denied to the plaintiff, and this statute in question when it
attempts to deny to the trial judge his common law power 14 to
right that wrong by granting a new trial is in conflict with these
constitutional provisions.
Sec. 14 Ky. Const., Sec. 64 Ind. Const., Sec. 13, Art. II Ark.
Const., Sec. 13, Art. II, Okla. Const.
1

"Blair v.WiZliams, 14 Ky. 34 (1823), and Lapsley v. Brashears, 14
*Ky. 46 (1823).
3Ludwig v. Johnson, 242 Ky. 543, 4b S. W. (2d) 347 (1932).
" Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 3, side page 387. Lord Mansfield
in Bright v. ,ynon, I Burrow 390 (1757"), Lopez v. De Tastet, 8 Taunt.
712 (1819), Capital Traction Co. v. Ho1., 174 U. S.1, 19 Sup. Ct. 58, 43
L. ed. 873 (1898). Note p. 12, Ann. Cas. 1914A. Note Ann. Cas.
1912D, p. 589.
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"Where the verdict of a jury and the judgment entered thereon
are so grossly inadequate as to shock one's sense of justice, after it
has found a recovery should be had, it is the bounden duty 1of a reviewing court to set aside the verdict and award a new trial." 5

Jurors sometimes allow their passions and their prejudices
to be reflected in their verdicts; for example, a verdict of $1.00
was returned for the negligent killing of a man 22 years of
16
age, a like'sum for the negligent killing of a 17-year-old boy,
$300.00 for the negligent killing of a 20-year old miner, 17 $1.00
for serious personal injuries and the loss of two horses and a
buggy,18 1 cent for the loss of an arm, 19 1 cent for the loss of 21a
hand 20 and $1.00 for negligent killing of a boy 20 years of age.
If space allowed, these instances of freak verdicts could be multiplied a hundred fold. When such verdicts as these are returned and allowed to stand justice is denied just as effectually
as if the judge had ordered the cases stricken when first he saw
them on the docket, or the clerks had refused to file them when
they were presented to them.
The statute in question conflicts with a right that English
jurisprudence has cherished since it was written into Magna
Carta. We speak of Magna Carta with a feeling of veneration
yet its greatness lies not so much in what it meant to its framers
in 1215 as in what it has come to mean to the political leaders,
the judges, the lawyers and the great mass of men over whom
the English system of jurisprudence has since 1215 been extended. To have produced it, to have preserved it, and to have
matured it, give to England an immortal claim upon the respect
and esteem of mankind.
In his "Middle Ages," Vol. 11, 451, Hallam says: "A
law which enacts that justice shall neither be sold, denied nor
delayed, stamps with infamy the government under which such
a law had become necessary." What would Hallam say if he
should return to earth, visit this fair land of ours, hear some
of our boasts of freedom, justice, progress and enlightenment
Greer v. Board of Commissioners, 169 N. E. 709 (1927).
26Thompson v. Town of Fort Branch, 178 N. E. 440, 82 A. L. R.
1413 (1931).
"Kinser v. Soap Creek Coal Co., 85 Iowa, 26, 51 N. W. 1151 (1892).
Carpenter v. City of Red Cloud, 64 Neb. 126, 89 N. W. 637 (1892).
"Baries v. Louisville Electric Light Co., 118 Ky. 830, 80 S. W. 814
(1904).
"Ray v. Jeffries, 75 Ky. 465 (1876).
= Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Dean, 15 Pac. (2d) 595 (1932).
'
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and then learn that in four of our states not only are denials
of justice of every day occurrence but that we actually have
statutes on our books to aid and abet these denials, by attempting to deny the trial judge his common law power to correct
them by granting new trials ?
It is a Legislative Attempt to Exercise a JudiciaZl Function.
Constitutional government in this nation is distinguished
by the care with which the executive, legislative and judicial
functions are separated and committed to separate departments,
which are each forbidden to encroach upon the field of activities
22
belonging to another.
That the making of and rigid adherence to such a partition
of power is absolutely necessary to the preservation of civil liberty is the solemn statement of all great writers, for example,
25
23
DePaley, 24 Sir William Blackstone,
Baron Montesquieu,
2
7
Justice Taney, 2s
President Madison, 26 Alexander Hamilton,
Justice Cooley,2 9 Justice Brewer 30 Justice Kent,31 and others.
The judicial power of this Commonwealth is vested in the
courts.32 The power and discretion to receive or reject the verdict of a jury, and to refuse or direct a new trial is strictly
judicial (It is a part of trial by jury, as shall be pointed out
later). It exists in the courts by constitutional grant and no
one can show a statute upon which it is dependent or from
which it is derived. In view of this tripartite separation of the
powers of governmeilt, when those of one department attempt to
exercise any of the powers belonging to another department that
If our Court of Appeals or
act is void and unconstitutional.
the Supreme court of any other state should undertake to grant
"Sec. 27 and 28 of Ky. Const. Art. III, Sec. 1, Ind. Const., and
Sec. 103, Ind. Stats. Art. IV, Sec. 1 and Sec. 2, Ark. Const. Art. IV,
Sec. 1, Okla. Const.
0 Spirit of Laws, Bk. II, Ch. 6.
'2 Moral Philosophy, Bk. 6, Oh. 8.
21Commentaries, Bk. 2, ch. 6.
w46th and 47th numbers of the Federalist.
"The Federalist, No. 47.
U. S. v. Ferreira,13 Howard 40, 14 L. ed. 42 (1851).
Cont. 1Am. 413.
"Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. ed. 819
(1897).
"Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns 477 (1811).
1"Sec. 109 Ky. Conet.
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a pardon to a convicted man, no one would pay any attention
to iti for the act would be void. If the Governor of Kentucky
or the Governor of any other state should in most solemn fashion enter upon the executive journals a judgment that John Doe
should recover of Richard Roe, five hundred dollars with interest no one would pay the slightest attention to it and the judgment would be absolutely void, or if either or all of these governors should in most solemn fashion and under the great seal
of the state write to the most humble justice of the peace in the
most remote district of the state and direct him to enter a judgment for $50.00 in favor of Samuel Swift v. Stephen Slow, that
act would be void and the judgment would not be entered.
Just so, when the legislature by this statute in question attempts to tell a judge what order he shall enter in disposing of
a motion for a new trial, no attention should be paid to it for
the act is unconstitutional and void. The legislature can make
reasonable regulations concerning new trials. It can require
the motion to be made within a certain reasonable time after
judgment, that it be in writing and. can require the judge to
pass upon that motion within a certain reasonable time, but it
can not tell the judge what his order shall be. That is a matter
of judicial discretion and when the legislature attempts to say
how the judge shall rule upon a motion for a new trial or attempts to make any regulation that would unreasonably hamper
the judiciary in the free exercise of its discretion or attempts to
tell the judiciary what its decision shall be, then the legislature
has gone beyond its proper sphere and its act is unconstitutional
and void.
Here are some things of interest said by courts of last resort:
"In determining whether a statute is invalid as a legislative assumption of judicial power, it is of importance to note whether under
the proceeding authorized by such statute all questions of a judicial
nature are left to the judgment of the courts."'
"The right to review, or to try anew, facts which have been determined by a verdict or decree, depends on fixed and well-settled
principles, which it is the duty of the court to apply in the exercise
of a sound judgment and discretion.11u
"The power to order new trials is judicial; but the power of the
legislature is not judicial. It is limited to the making of laws; not to
Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 210, 17
13 6 R. C. L., D. 161, See. 160.
L. ed. 783 (1865).
Denny v. Matton, 2 Allen (Mass.) 361, 79 Am. Dec. 784.
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the exposition or execution of them.

The functions of the several

parts of the government are thoroughly separated, and distinctly assigned to the principal branches of it, the legislative, the executive,
and the judiciary, which, within their respective departments are
equal and co-ordinate. Each derives its authority, mediately or immediately, from the people, and each is responsible, mediately or immediately, to the people for the exercise'of it. When either shall have
usurped the power of one or both of its fellows, then will have been
effected a revolution, not in the form of the government, but in its
action. Then will there be a concentration of the powers of the government in a single branch of it, which, whatever may be the form
of the constitution, will be despotism-a government of unlimited,
irresponsible and arbitrary rule.
"It is idle to say the authority of each branch is defined and limited in the constitution, if there be not an independent power able and
willing to enforce the limitations .
..
"It has become the duty of the court to temporize no longer, but to
resist, temperately, though firmly, any invasion of its province, whether
great or small."15
"Those in authority in the other departments can not even so
much as cross the line dividing the domain of the judicial from the
other departments to make a suggestion as to how the judicial department shall perform its functions or what kind of judgments or decrees
it ought to render."36

It is not easy to draw the line between things judicial and.
things legislative. It has been said that matters judicial relate
to things that have passed and that legislative matters are directed in futuro,3

7

yet that is not always true, else courts could

not issue injunctions which are always directed in futuro. Chief
Justice Shaw said,3 8

legal principle."

"Extreme

cases are allowable to test a

Suppose the legislature should enact:

That

hereafter no judgment shall be deemed excessive; that an ac-

cused shall not be allowed to plead self defense; that 80% of
all cases appealed shall be affirmed; that in the verdict the jury
shall name the witnesses they believe; that 80% of all men accused of crime shall be convicted; that a court shall never give

a peremptory instruction; that a court shall never grant a continuance; etc. No one would pay the slightest attention to such
statutes although directed in futuro.

Not everything a legislature tries to do is legislative merely
because directed in futuro.

For example, in 1862 the Kentucky

legislature passed an act declaring a man expatriated himself by
thereafter joining the Confederate army, and that whenever a
"De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18, 53 Am. Dec. 570
(1850).
Board of Comrs. v. Gwin, 136 Ind. 562, 36 N. E. 237, 22 L. R. A.
402 (1894).
1' 12 . J., D. 307, Sec. 239.
13.In Com. v. Bssex Co., 13 Gray, 239, 253 (1859).
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person undertook to vote, hold office, serve on a jury, etc., he
could be required to swear he had done none of the things denounced by the act. (This was what old Confederate soldiers
termed "Taking the oath.") This act was directed in futuro,
yet the Court of Appeals39 held it void as an attempt to exercise a judicial function, and in doing so said:
"To decitizenize a freeman is a tremendous blow. It deprives
him of his chosen country and h6me, and sunders his most endearing
relations, social and civil. Is not this severely punitory; and who can
be lawfully so punished without conviction; and how can there be
lawful conviction without trial and proof; and what other department
than the judiciary can try and decide on the evidence?
"This is necessarily a judicial question, which can be constitutionally decided by the judiciary on a full and fair trial on an indictment or a presentment."

There are many matters that are judicial in their very
essence, and because thereof any attempt on the part of the legislature to direct what the court shall do (in the future mind
you) is unconstitutional, for example: Acts requiring appellate
courts to write opinions, 40 acts providing that certain corporations shall be accepted by courts aa sole surety, where security
42
is required, 41 acts making the finding of a referee conclusive,
acts providing that no injunction shall issue against certain
commissioners, 43 and acts declaring certain evidence shall be
conclusive. 44
Whether a verdict is adequate or inadequate is a question
that can be answered only after a consideration of the law and
the evidence, and its determination is a judicial act. "Judiciaz
' 45
power exists only in the courts. It can not live elsewhere."
Whien it finds lodgment elsewhere tyranny is in the offing.
When by a motion for a new trial, the correctness of a verdict awarding inadequate damages, is challenged there is raised
the question whether that verdict is consonant with the law and
the evidence, a question that in its very essence is judicial, and
when by the statute in question the legislature has bluntly or'Burkett v. McCarty, 73 Ky. (10 Bush.) 758 (1874).
Vaughn v. Harp, 49 Ark. 160, 4 S. W. 751 (1887); Houston v.
Williams, 13 Calif. 24, 73 Am. Dec. 565 (1859); Speight v. People, 87
Ill. 595 (1877).
4'Matter of American Ba-nking Co., 4 Pa. Dist. 757 (1895).
4In

re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854).

Guy v. Hermance, 5 Calif. 73, 63 Am. Dec. 85 (1855).
U. S. v. Klein, 20 L. ed. 519 (1871); White v. Flinn, 23 Ind. 46
(1864); Wantlan v. White, 19 Ind. 471 (1862).
0Edwards v. Dykeman, 95 Ind. 509 (1884).

K. L. J.-5
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dered the court to refuse it, the legislature has invaded the field
constitutionally allotted to the judiciary and the act is void.
Of course all the departments of government, executive,
legislative and judicial can be vested in one man, as under
Attilla and :under Genghis Kahn, or in one body as in France
during the Reign of Terror. We are bound to admit the acts of
those governments, though not entirely admirable, were nevertheless entirely legal, but our governments are not so constituted,
and considering the statute that we have, under our constitutions as they are, and under the lights that are at hand, there
can be but one conclusion:
The statute in question is absolutely void.
The judge who presided at the trial is better fitted to decide
whether a new trial should be granted under the circumstances
than the legislature which knows nothing of the facts. It is a
judicial question, it should be left to the judiciary, yet the legislature in all its ignorance of the circumstances attempts by the
statute in question to determine the matter and bluntly say the
motion shall be denied.
The statute in question is not an attempt to regulate the
procedure for obtaining a new trial, but is a blunt order to the
trial judge that under certain circumstances he must deny the
motion. It would be difficult to conceive of a more glaringly
unconstitutional act than our statute in question.
Does it Conflict with the ConstitutionalProvisionDeclaring the
Ancient Mode of Trial by Jury Shall Remain Inviolate?
A great lawyer to whom this question was put, replied:
"Of course not, for when this statute is applied 'trial by jury' is
over."

That answer was made because that great lawyer had not
thought of what trial by jury consists.
Kentucky has thus defined it :46
"'Trial by jury' in the primary and usual sense of the term at
the common law and in the American constitutions, is not merely a
trial by a jury of twelve men before an officer vested with authority
to cause them to be summoned and impaneled, to administer oaths to
them and to the constable in charge, and to enter judgment and issue
execution on their verdict; but it is a trial by a jury of twelve men,
46Wenling

v. Com., 143 Ky. 587, 137 S. W. 205 (1911).
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in the .presence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered
to instruct them 6n: the law and to advise them on the facts, and
(except on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict if
in his opinion it is against the law or the evidence. This proposition
has been so generally admitted, and so seldom contested, that there
has been little occasion for its distinct assertion."

This definition of "Trial by Jury" Ngas copied by Kentucky from a definition given by the United States Supreme
Court 47 and is one that has been accepted and followed generally.48
When we separate this definition into its elements and look
-atit in detail we see that:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

A jury of 12 men must be legally selected.
A duly commissioned judge must be presiding.
re must superintend the jury, that is, direct the trial.
He must instruct them in the law.
He must advise them on the facts, that is, determine
what evidence the jury shall hear.
Except on acquittal of a criminal charge, he must set
aside their verdict if in his opinion it is against the
law or the evidence.

Thus we see there are six essential elemeftts of trial by
jury, one no more sacred than another. The powers and functions of the judge are just as much a part of trial by jury and
are just as much preserved from violation as those of the jury.
The constitutional provisions cited forbid the invasion of either.
The statute in question strikes down one of those elements
(element f) when it denies to the judge the right he had at common law to award a new trial. It is a wise provision that gives
such power to a judge for juries sometimes go wild and return
verdicts that do rank injustice, for example, where a verdict of
$1.00 was returned for the negligent killing of a healthy man,
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof., 174 U. S. 1, 43, L. ed. 873, 19 S.
C
Ct. 580 (1898).
48Davis v. Cent. States Fire Ins. Co., 121 Kan. 69, 245 Pac. 1062
(1926). Demnee v. McCoy, 4 Ind. Ter. 233, 69 S. W. 858 (1902). State
v. McMahon, 17 Nev. 365, 30 Pac. 1000 (1883). In re Opinion of Justices,
41 N. H. 550 (1860). Hallett v. Boyer, 114 N. Y. S. 559 (1909). Grisson v. State, 16 Okl. Cr. 569, 185 Pac. 452 (1919). Smith v. Atlantic
& C. R. Co., 25 Ohio St. 91 (1874). White v. White, 108 Tex 570, 196
S. W. 508, L. R. A. 1918A, 339 (1917). Peo. v. Hopt, 3 Utah, 396 4 Pac.
250 (1884). 35 C. J., p. 143, Sec. 9.
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22 years of age. 49 Other verdicts of similar nature could be
cited.
Out of the numerous cases in which this statute has been
involved the question of its constitutionality has been mentioned
but three times. In the Franke cases 50 the court cites as
persuasive if not convincing evidence that the bar and the courts
concede the validity of the statute. The fact that men have
not thought on the question of this statute's conflict with the
constitution is no evidence of the absence of conflict. One might
just as well argue there is no such thing as the law of gravitation because no one thought of it before Newton announced it
in 1687.
The first court to consider the constitutionality of this
statute was the United States Circuit Court. 51 It discussed the
question and said the statute was unconstitutional. Liberal
quotations from the opinion are unnecessary.
The next time its constitutionality -was mentioned it was
barely referred to and without any discussion of the question
at all the court refused to reverse an inadequate judgment 52 and
said: "In so holding we violate no constitutional right, state
or federal, of appellant."
In a later case 53 the Kentucky Court of Appeals seriously
and carefully considered the question, but failed to note the
distinction between the right of the trial court on timely
motion to grant a new trial and the right of a litigant to prosecute an appeal from its judgment. The right of appeal is
purely statutory and may be partially or entirely withheld but
the right to move for and for proper cause to obtain a new trial
is a part of the ancient common law "Trial by 'Jury" which
may not be constitutionally denied. As a result of its failure to
note this distinction the court held this statute constitutional
and rested its decision upon this citation:
"It is entirely within the province of the legislature to restrict or
to abridge the right to a new trial to any extent it may see fit, even
1,Greer v. Board of Commissioners, 169 N. E. 169 (1929).
14Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S. W. (2d) 969, 88 A. L. R. 917
(1900).
uHughey v. Sulivan, 80 Fed. 72 (1897).
Galliaer v. Southern Harlan Coal Co., 247 Ky. 752, 57 S. W.
(2d) 645 (1933).
,46 C. J., iD.59. Sec. 2.
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to the. extent of denying to a litigant the privilege of moving for a

new trial."

Corpus Juris uses that very language in its text and cites
in support thereof but one case, State v. Cascade Co. Etc., 64
Mont. 181, 208 Pac. 952.
Montana has a statute which provides that a motion for a
new trial that is not passed upon within 15 days after submission shall be treated as denied. Such a motion had been submitted on April 22, 1922, and on May 13th. or 21 days after submission the judge entered an order granting a new trial and
State v. Cascade Co., Etc., was an original action before the
Montana Supreme Court to quash that order granting a new
trial, and the only question before the Court was whether the
provision, that a motion for a new trial, not passed on in 15
days after submission, should be treated as denied, was a
reasonable regulation which the legislature had the power to
make and when the court said it was, it was through deciding
the case and what it said thereafter about the power of the legislature to abridge the right to move for a new trial to any
extent it saw fit and even to deny it altogether is not only dictum but is not the law.
In the Franke cases the Kentucky Court of Appeals trod
upon the quicksand of a judicial dictum found in Corpus Juris,
the erroneousness of which will perhaps more clearly appear
when it is contrasted with another excerpt from the same work,
remembering always that the right of the trial court to set
aside a jury's verdict and to grant a new trial is a part of the
"ancient mode of trial by jury," which our constitution declares shall remain inviolate:
It
is entirely within the
province of the legislature to restrict or to abridge the right to
a new trial to any extent it may
see fit even to the extent of denying to a litigant the privilege
of moving for a fiew trial. 46 C.
J., p. 59, Sec. 2.

The legislature may make any
reasonable regulations as to the
practice and procedure in civil
cases as long as the right to a
jury trial is not materially impaired. 35 C. 3., p. 226, Sec. 146.

These two excerpts are in direct conflict, the latter is correct, the former is erroneous.
Corpus Juris should amend its text so as to read:
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"So long as it does not impinge upon some constitutional provision, it is entirely within the province of the legislature to make
reasonable regulations regarding the granting of new trials."

The rule is correctly stated in 16 I. C. L., p. 196 et seq.,
See. 15:
"The constitutional provision that the 'right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate' means that it shall not be destroyed or annulled
by legislation nor so hampered or restricted as to make the provision
a nullity . . . The legislature . . . may impose restrictions or
regulations upon the exercise of the right as long as its substance and
its vital purposes are conserved . . . Always, however, in view of
the provisions of the constitution that the cherished right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate, . . . the inclination of the court
should be to protect and enf6rce the right."

Sometimes we can test the soundness of a ruling by looking at the mischief that may be wrought under it, or as Justice
Shaw said :54 "Extreme cases are allowable to test a legal principle." Suppose the Kentucky legislature should enact a statute like this:
"A new trial shall not be granted for failure of the court to
properly instruct the jury."

Would not the court if it adhered to the ruling in the
Franke cases be compelled to hold such a statute constitutional!
The same would be true of a statute like this:
"A new trial shall not be granted for any error of the court in
admitting or rejecting evidence."
Also of this one:
"A new trial shall not be granted because the jury may. have
received evidence outside of court."
And this one:
"A new trial shall not be granted for any misconduct of the jury,
the court, the successful party or his counsel."

Or suppose the legislature in an outburst of economy should
so repeal and modify the statutes as to provide:
"All petit juries in civil cases shall be composed of three men
only, a majority of whom by signing it may make a verdict."

And should further provide:
"A new trial shall not be granted because the jury was composed of less than 12 men."

Each of these supposed statutes would have to be held con5

In Cor. v. Essex Co., 13 Gray, 239, 253 (1859).

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE REFUSING TRIAL

467

stitutional if the ruling in the Franke cases is to be adhered to,
and thus the legislature could if it saw fit by such statutes entirely destroy "trial by jury" as the makers of our constitutions understood it.
The history of this i tatute.
The first state to adopt a code of practice was New York in
1848, then followed Missouri in 1849, California in 1850, Kentucky and Minnesota in 1851, etc.
This statute first appeared in the Kentucky Code of Practice in civil cases. 55 No such provision was contained in the
codes of New York, Missouri or California, nor is such to be
found in any of the five volumes of suggested material prepared
for and used by the New York legislature in the preparation of
the code adopted by that state.
The act adopting the Kentucky Code (Ch. 616, Acts 1851)
was approved March 22, 1851, the act adopting the code of
Minnesota was approved March 31, 1851. Aside from Sec. 381
and See. 382 the Minnesota Code then adopted is almost exactly like the Kentucky Code then adopted. This striking similarity suggests that the same sourge book was used in both
Kentucky and Minnesota, and the appearance of this statute
in Kentucky suggests it was inserted by some crafty hand but
whose it was or why or how exerted can not now be learned.
In 1852 Indiana adopted a code very largely copied from
Kentucky and this statute became a part of it;56 the same is
true of the Ohio Code adopted in 1853,57 of the Nebraska Code
adopted in 1855, 5 8 of the Kansas Code adopted in 1859, 59 of the
Iowa Code of 1860,60 of the Arkansas Code copied from Kentucky in 1868,01 and of the Oklahoma Code copied from Kansas
in 1890.62
53Sec. 382 Cde of 1851, Sec. 370 Code of 1854 and Sec. 341 Code
of 1876.
MSee. 353 Code of Ind., now Sec. 611 Ind. Stats.
' Sec. 298 Code of Ohio, later See. 5306 Ohio Stats.
Sec. 315 Nebraska Code.
Sec. 307 Kansas Code, later Sec. 4755 Gen. Stats. of Kansas.
Sec. 3113 Iowa Stats. of 1860, See. 2839 Iowa Stats. of 1873.
Sec. 372 Ark. Code 1868, now Sec. 1312 Ark. Stats.
"Sec. 5034 Okla. laws 1910, Sec. 573 Okla. laws 1921 and now
Sec. 399 Okla. laws 1931.
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The statute was repealed by Iowa in 1897, 63 by Ohio in
1898,64 by Kansas in 1905, 65 and by Nebraska in 1911.66
The Court of Arkansas has never mentioned this statute
although it has been on the books in that state for more than
65 years. Cases decided under it are collected in a note published in 88 A. L. R., p. 943 et seq., so there is no need for listing tJhem here. It was passed at a time when (as the Nebraska
Court suggested) 67 greater regard was shown for property rights
than human rights but the question now is this:
'What shall be done about it?
First, of all things the question must be studied. The
Judicial Council without a dissenting vote asked the legislature
to repeal it and a bill for that purpose was introduced but an
active lobby working for the railroads succeeded this year- in
stopping it in the hands of the committee.
The statute is unconstitutional and thinking lawyers Will
soon discover ways to so convince the court§. Once it is held
unconstitutional its repeal will follow. An attack on its constitutionality is not answered by calling attention to its age.
Constitutionality does not grow on a statute as moss grows on
a roof.
"Where the constitutionality of a statute is directly called in
question, the decision will not be controlled by the fact that such
statute has been assumed to be constitutional, in several decisions,
where the question was not raised."I'
"The Court will not adhere to a doctrine which, although established by previous decisions, they are convinced is erroneous." C
"The doctrine (Stare decisis) has never been given the force of
depriving courts of the right to correct an erroneous holding.""
"An adherence to it (Stare decisis) is necessary to preserve the
uniformity of the law, .

.

. but the rule is not so strictly observed

nor is the maxim
where the questioned decision is of recent utterance,
itself always imperative or necessarily binding."''
' When new code was adopted.
6, See 93 Ohio laws, p. 217.

6 See Chap. 332 Laws of Kansas for 1905.
14See Chap. 169 Laws of Nebraska for 1911.
'1O'Reilly v. Hoover, 70 Neb. 357, 97 N. W. 70 (1903).
6815 C. J., p. 977, Sec. 341, note 40.
15 C. J.., p. 957, Sec. 357, note 20.
oL. & X. R. Co. v. Hutton, 220 Ky. 277, 295 S. W. 175 (1927).
"'Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen, 168 Ky. 836, 183 S. W. 247,
L. R. A. 1916D, 924 (1916).
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"A person not a party or a privy to the action, can not acquire a
vested right in an erroneous decision made therein."1'
73
It does
The rule will not be applied to perpetuate error.
not apply in tort cases. A litigant can not invoke the doctrine

unless he has relied upon and acted under the former decision.
It is the duty of the court to overrule an erroneous decision where
no rule of property is involved.
"When a question involving important public or private rights,
extending, through all coming time, has been passed upon a single occasion, and which decision can in no just sense be said to have been
acquiesced in, it is not only the right, but the duty, of the court, when
properly called upon, to re-examine the questions involved, and again
subject them to judicial scrutiny. We are by no means unmindful of
the lessons furnished by our own consciousness, as well as by judicial
history, of the liability to error and the advantages of review."'1

The question should be re-examined.

The Franke cases are

unsound, and should be overruled. The statute is void for its
denial of trial by jury, of equal protection of the law, its denial
of justice and its assumption of judicial power.

Criglerv. hepler, 79 Kan. 834, 101 Pac. 619, 23 L. R. A. N. S. 500
(1909).
1115 C. J., p. 956, See. 357.
"4 Montgomery Co. Fiscal Court v. Trimble, 104 Ky. 629, 47 S. W.
773 (1898). 42 L. R. A. 738.

